We examine the implications of the positive correlation of mortality and disability for the benefits of combining an immediate income annuity with long-term care disability coverage at retirement ages. Specifically, we show that combining the two products could reduce the cost of both coverages and make them available to more persons by reducing adverse selection in the income annuity and minimizing the need for medical underwriting for disability coverage. We find that minimal underwriting, excluding only those who would be eligible for disability benefits at purchase, would increase the potential market to 98 percent of 65-year-olds, compared with only 77 percent under current long-term care insurance underwriting practice. After the 2 percent representing the worst risks for high disability payments is excluded, simulated premiums for the combined product are lower by 3 to 5 percent than total simulated premiums for stand-alone income annuities and underwritten long-term care disability insurance purchased separately. We estimate premiums for all persons at age 65 and age 75 and premiums by gender at age 65. We also investigate the value of such a combined benefit to various subgroups of prospective purchasers and the implications of possible errors and moral hazard in the reporting of disability status and making claims.
INTRODUCTION
As the baby boom generation nears retirement, concerns are increasing as to how the larger and longer-lived cohorts that will be turning 65 over the next 20 to 30 years will finance their long-term care needs. Retirement health and income security policies typically are considered separately. Disability requiring long-term care is an issue that links the two because it can result in catastrophic costs but generally is not insured. Median family income for those age 65 or older in 1998 was $23,000-$33,000 for married couples and $16,000 for unmarried persons (Social Security Administration, 2000) . Although two-thirds of retirees received some income from assets, asset earnings at the median was only about $2,000 and accounted for only 20 percent of aggregate income for those age 54 and older (Social Security Administration, 2000) . With private rates for nursing home care averaging between $35,000 and $50,000 per year in 1997, depending on the level of care and type of facility (Gabrel, 2000) , a lengthy stay could be a financial disaster for many retirees. Home care can be a lowercost and more desirable long-term care solution when appropriate. However, it also can pose a substantial threat to financial security, particularly for those with more severe disability or complex medical conditions requiring expensive skilled care.
Although Medicare and private supplementary health coverage reduce the financial risks associated with acute healthcare for nearly all elderly people, no similar, nearly universal public or private coverage exists for long-term care. The welfare-oriented Medicaid program is the primary public funder of long-term care, but it reaches only those with the lowest income and assets. Medicare finances long-term care only under limited circumstances. Private long-term care insurance still plays a minor role. No more than 5 to 7 percent of the elderly hold policies (Coronel, 1998 ; American Academy of Actuaries, 1999) . Numerous proposals for extending public coverage for long-term care were unsuccessful during the 1980s and as part of reform efforts of the early 1990s. More recently, policy has focused on private solutions for all but those poor enough to qualify for Medicaid.
Meanwhile, although Social Security continues to be a mandatory inflation-adjusted annuity paid out over the lives of retired workers and their spouses, employer-sponsored pension plans are shifting from the defined benefit form to the defined contribution form. A life annuity traditionally was the only payment option in defined benefit plans but typically is not even offered as a distribution method in defined contribution plans. Even among defined benefit plans, lump-sum distributions are increasingly offered and taken by plan participants. Proposed partial privatization of Social Security could imply a further shift away from automatic annuitization at a time of increasing longevity and the resulting higher risk of outliving accumulated assets.
In this article, we analyze a method for explicitly linking planning for long-term care and income security. Although a number of factors appear to contribute to the relatively small markets for private long-term care insurance and immediate income annuities, an important factor appears to be adverse selection, which increases the cost of income annuities and limits through medical underwriting the number of persons who can purchase long-term care insurance. In this study, we examine an annuity that provides jointly for income and disability payments. We simulate its potential for reducing adverse selection in both products and thereby expanding their markets. Although the analysis is framed in terms of a private product, the results also have implications for the underlying distributional properties of public programs.
Adverse selection is the tendency of those who have reason to expect greater-thanaverage benefits to be more likely to purchase any insurance-type product priced for the average risk. Without a mechanism to control this tendency, premiums are driven upward and become increasingly less attractive to average and below-average risk purchasers. Adverse selection occurs in immediate annuities because they primarily attract purchasers with above-average expected longevity. This situation makes annuities more expensive than if purchasers had average longevity. Similarly, insurers believe that long-term care insurance appeals more to those with greater expectation of disability. To protect themselves from poor risks, insurers use medical underwriting to identify and exclude purchasers with preexisting disabilities or other health conditions that are believed to result in higher near-term claims costs. These conditions also result, however, in shorter-than-average survival (Murtaugh, Kemper, and Spillman, 1995) .
The central hypothesis of this analysis is that pooling the two opposing risks-long life versus short life with disability-in theory has the potential to reduce both adverse selection in the income annuity and the need for underwriting in long-term care insurance. If that is true in application, such a combined product could be priced more cheaply than separately purchased products and could be made available to more people.
We investigate these propositions empirically using data from the 1986 National Mortality Followback Survey (NMFS) projected to represent hypothetical purchasing pools at ages 65 and 75 in 1995. We simulate the number of persons eligible to purchase a combined product with minimal medical underwriting for the disability benefit and estimate implied premiums for the combined product relative to those for separate purchase of stand-alone products. Our results are estimated single premiums paid at purchase.
BACKGROUND
Income annuities and long-term care insurance are potentially relevant for most retirement-age persons. The exception is those with the lowest income and assets, who are likely to qualify for medical assistance through Medicaid if they become disabled and need long-term care, particularly nursing home care. They are unlikely to have sufficient income from pensions or accumulated assets to purchase private long-term care insurance or annuities. Excluding these low-income persons, most retired persons face a risk of outliving their assets, and nursing home and home care costs represent major threats to financial security. For the most part, these persons have incentives to avoid Medicaid eligibility, which requires "spenddown" to minimal assets, to avoid financial dependency, limited choice of long-term care providers, and potentially poor quality of care.
Life Annuities
The essential characteristic of a life annuity is that payments continue for the lifetime of the purchaser-it is insurance against running out of money. Drawing income directly from assets provides no insurance against fluctuations in asset returns or against outliving accumulated savings. As a result, the standard of living may need to be lower as a precaution against running out of money. Annuity payments may be either guaranteed (fixed or increasing) or variable depending on the underlying investments. The annuity frequently offers a guaranteed period over which benefits will be paid even if the purchaser does not survive. In this analysis, we simulate only annuities with a guaranteed period-one with a level lifetime payment and one with payments that increase for inflation at a fixed rate.
One disadvantage of a life annuity is illiquidity, because assets cannot be recovered after purchase, regardless of special needs, for example, long-term care costs. A second major disadvantage attributed to individual life annuities is that they are "expensive," primarily because of the cost of adverse selection. Previous studies have estimated this cost to be about 10 percentage points on premiums for straight life annuities, that is, immediate annuities without guaranteed periods (Warshawsky, 1988; Friedman and Warshawsky, 1990; Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky, and Brown, 1999; and Poterba and Finkelstein, 1999) . Reducing adverse selection would reduce the price and therefore increase the value of life annuities.
Long-Term Care Insurance
The risk of needing long-term care after retirement and the cost of care are substantial, but as noted, such care is largely uninsured. More than 40 percent of those age 65 or older are expected to spend some time in a nursing home, and almost one in ten will spend five or more years there before they die (Kemper and Murtaugh, 1991) . A larger proportion of people will need some long-term care, including home care, in their remaining lifetimes. About 17 percent of those age 65 or older had disability requiring some type of human help in 1994, and only 29 percent of them were in nursing homes (Spillman and Pezzin, 2000) . The average annual cost for a stay in a nursing home in 1997 was about $35,000 for residential care, $40,000 for intermediate care, and $50,000 for skilled care (Gabrel, 2000) . Home care visits cost $50 to $100 on average in 1996, depending on the skill level of services provided, according to data from the National Association for Home Care. Nationally, long-term care spending exceeds $115 billion a year, at least 40 percent of which is paid privately (Braden et al., 1998) . Much of public long-term care spending is focused on those with very low incomes.
A number of reasons have been put forth for the small market penetration of private insurance. There is a theoretical argument and some empirical evidence that the existence of Medicaid, even though it is a welfare program, dampens the market for private insurance (Pauly, 1989; Sloan and Norton, 1997) , as well as a behavioral argument that parents do not purchase insurance as a strategy to ensure help from their children (Pauly, 1990) . Low market penetration also may reflect reluctance to purchase in a relatively immature market, where both insurance products and the delivery system are changing significantly (Cohen, 1998) . Most long-term care insurance adopts the classic indemnity approach, paying only eligible expenses for specified services so that even currently well-designed policies can become outdated quickly. Some argue that long-term care insurance may be beyond the means of most of the elderly. Estimates of the percent of the elderly who could afford coverage, in which affordability is defined as meaning that purchasers should spend no more than a specified percentage of income, tend to range between 10 and 20 percent; those estimates that also consider assets indicate that affordability is more widespread (Wiener, Tilly, and Goldenson, 2000) . The value that would-be purchasers place on insurance also affects whether a given level of income and assets leads to purchase. Cutler (1993) has suggested that the fixed or nominally adjusted benefits found in current longterm care insurance products leave purchasers exposed to the risk of long-term cost increases, reducing the value placed on the coverage.
However, another more directly measurable factor limiting private insurance and the one most relevant to the present analysis is medical underwriting. Murtaugh, Kemper, and Spillman (1995) estimated that between 12 and 23 percent of the population would be rejected for private long-term care insurance for health reasons if everyone applied at age 65, and 20 to 31 percent would be rejected at age 75. Although some insurers are now offering risk-rated premiums, underwriting remains a substantial impediment to expansion of private long-term care insurance (Collett, 1999) . Moreover, the underwriting process itself is expensive and difficult.
Combined Life and Disability Annuity
The idea of combining income and disability protection has currency in the private market and has been discussed in a preliminary way in academic literature. Since this research was completed, trade press accounts indicate that five or six insurers have begun offering various forms of a combined life annuity and disability policy. In addition, after completing this research, we became aware of one company that has been marketing an individual disability-escalating annuity for several years, based on research conducted by Christopherson (1992) . With one exception, a deferred annuity platform is used to avoid the adverse selection that would otherwise arise from the lack of underwriting for the disability component. All the combined annuities seem to take the cash disability payment approach, as opposed to the indemnity approach nearly universal in stand-alone long-term care insurance policies. The commercial success of these products is unknown. To our knowledge, no insurer has yet employed the central insight that combining an immediate life annuity and disability benefits could reduce adverse selection and increase the number of persons qualifying to purchase insurance against the risk of needing long-term care.
The idea of combining lifetime income and long-term care disability protection has also appeared in academic literature. Pauly (1990) asserted that an annuity of this form (which did not then exist in the market) would maximize lifetime expected utility, although this result came in the context of exploring rational reasons for not purchasing long-term care insurance in the absence of such an annuity. In the mid 1990s, one economist proposed a related partially public approach through which a small percentage of Social Security benefits (essentially a public life annuity) would be set aside for a basic long-term care benefit (Chen, 1994) . There has been, however, little empirical research into the properties of this combination.
The specific form we estimate is a fixed immediate life annuity with payments that increase upon the determination of a chronic disability. The basic product is a life annuity that pays $1,000 a month for life with a guaranteed ten-year minimum payout, combined with a disability annuity that pays an additional $2,000 a month if the purchaser becomes chronically disabled in at least two activities of daily living (ADLs) or cognitively impaired, and an additional $1,000 a month if the purchaser becomes disabled in four ADLs. We also estimate premiums for this basic product with increasing payments meant to provide some protection against inflation. We chose the benefit amounts to be such that, combined with Social Security, they would cover both basic consumption needs and the average cost of nursing home care at most skill levels and in most regions at the higher benefit level and in some cases at the lower benefit level. Average annual costs ranged from $30,000 for residential care to $45,000 for skilled care in the South and Midwest; only skilled care in the West and intermediate and skilled care in the Northeast, all of which exceeded $50,000 on average, exceeded the estimated annuity benefits at the higher disability level (Gabrel, 2000) .
DATA AND METHODS
Our data are from the 1986 National Mortality Followback Survey (NMFS), a nationally representative sample of adults who died in 1986 (Seeman, Poe, and PowellGriner, 1993) . The 1986 NMFS is one survey of a series conducted by the National Center for Health Statistics to study causes of death and disease, demographic trends in mortality, and other healthcare issues.
For the 1986 survey, death certificates of 18,733 United States residents 25 years of age or older, representing approximately 1 percent of all deaths of U.S. residents age 25 or older in 1986, were drawn from the 1986 Current Mortality Sample. A survey of the next of kin supplements information on the death certificate. Respondents were asked to provide information about, among other things, the decedent's health history, limitations in physical and mental functioning, lifestyle (e.g., history of smoking, diet), socioeconomic characteristics, and use of nursing homes. The overall response rate to the questionnaire was 89 percent, leaving an unweighted sample of 16,587. For this analysis, we used data on subsamples of persons dying at age 65 or older (9,181 unweighted cases) and at age 75 or older (6,083 unweighted cases) to make estimates for simulated pools of persons likely or eligible to purchase annuity and disability products at those ages.
Both the health and functioning variables are critical to our simulation of prospective purchaser pools. The data on limitations in ADLs and cognitive impairment also are key for our benefit calculations because they are used as the criteria for receiving benefits in virtually all current long-term care insurance. The ADL limitations included in the 1986 NMFS were eating, toileting, dressing, bathing, and walking. A "limitation" was defined as receiving help or using special equipment for these activities during the last year of life. For each ADL, the survey asked the lifetime duration of the limitation. The age at which each ADL limitation began was calculated by subtracting this duration from age at death. Regarding cognitive impairment, the respondent was asked whether a doctor ever said that the decedent had Alzheimer's disease, chronic brain syndrome, dementia, senility, or any other serious memory impairment and when the diagnosis first was made. The Appendix provides more information on the disability measures and how our estimates compare with estimates from other surveys.
Explanation of Risk Category Groupings
To define this study's hypothetical pools of persons eligible and ineligible to purchase long-term care insurance, we used a simulation of underwriting for private long-term care insurance developed in previous research (Murtaugh, Kemper, and Spillman, 1995) . A variety of sources of information were reviewed to obtain information on underwriting practices, which were then approximated using the NMFS data.
We determined whether each person met any of the following six conditions associated with greater likelihood of being rejected for long-term care insurance at the prospective purchase age: (1) any ADL limitation; (2) cognitive impairment; (3) a major illness (e.g., chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, emphysema, or cancer that eventually led to death); (4) stroke; (5) heart attack within the past two years or any heart attack complicated by other factors; or (6) an unhealthy lifestyle defined as a history of heavy drinking or obesity as an adult. Individuals meeting more than one criterion appear in all relevant risk groups.
Definition of "Purchase Pool" Classifications. The foundation of our analysis is simulation of "prospective purchasers" of separate income annuities and long-term care policies under current long-term care insurance underwriting practice and prospective purchasers of a combined income and disability annuity under a scheme of minimal underwriting. We used those who had none of the underwriting characteristics, and whom we also knew had above-average longevity (Murtaugh, Kemper, and Spillman, 1995) , to represent prospective purchasers under current underwriting practice. Their complement, those who had any of the underwriting characteristics, were used to proxy nonpurchasers, who would find income annuities less attractive because of their below-average longevity and who would be ineligible to purchase longterm care insurance under current underwriting practice. To simulate minimal underwriting, we defined a second, expanded prospective purchaser pool as all persons except those who already would qualify for disability benefits under a combined income and disability annuity at purchase. Their complement is those who would be immediately eligible for disability benefits. They make up the nonpurchaser pool under minimal underwriting.
Reweighting for Projections
Because weighted estimates from the NMFS are for persons dying in 1986, the sample differs from individuals who currently make up the market for annuities and longterm care insurance, in two significant ways. First, the cohort of 1986 decedents has an over-representation of deaths at young ages because the number of persons turning 65 over the past several decades has increased. Second, there have been substantial gains in life expectancy, and these improvements are expected to continue. To adjust for these differences, the NMFS sample was reweighted, following methodology in Kemper and Murtaugh (1991) .
Reweighting Method. Our analysis examines two age groups: those turning 65 in 1995 and those turning 75 in 1995. Social Security Administration (SSA) cohort life tables for the appropriate birth cohorts (1930 and 1920) were used to adjust the distribution of elderly decedents age 65 or older and age 75 or older in 1986 by age at death and gender so that their mortality experience matched SSA Alternative II projections for these two age groups. Weights were then further adjusted so that the weighted totals for each projection age matched the number of persons of that age in 1995, using NCHS data. Table 1 summarizes the effect of the reweighting for decedents age 65 or older in 1986. The estimate of mean years of life remaining for persons age 65 is 3.0 years greater after reweighting, consistent with the overrepresentation of younger deaths in the cohort of 1986 decedents and with increases in life expectancy after age 65. The reweighting also increases the proportion of persons meeting disability criteria and the average length of time disabled individuals would be eligible for benefits. The former is because of the strong positive correlation between disability and age, and the increase in the relative size of the weights of persons dying at older ages as a result of the reweighting. The latter reflects a longer period of time, on average, between the onset of disability and death among disabled persons dying at older ages. Mean years with 4+ ADL benefits 1.1 1.3 a Persons meeting the 2+ ADL benefit criterion have 2+ ADLs or cognitive impairment starting after age 65 and lasting 120 days (90 days to qualify for benefits plus a 30-day waiting period). b Persons meeting the 4+ ADL benefit trigger have 4+ ADLs starting after age 65 and lasting 90 days (90 days to qualify for benefits with no additional waiting period).
Mortality Estimates for Purchasers of Annuities.
Besides the simulated eligibility to purchase long-term care insurance, a key factor for the validity of our estimates is the life expectancy of "prospective purchasers," under current underwriting practice, which should reasonably resemble the life expectancy of those who currently purchase annuities at prices reflecting the effects of adverse selection. Therefore, we compared our estimates of mortality beginning at age 65 for this group with actuarial estimates of mortality at age 65 for actual purchasers of immediate annu-ities. The data on the mortality of annuitants in 1995 are based on the Annuity 2000 mortality table published by the Society of Actuaries .
The difference in mortality rates between our prospective purchasers under current long-term care underwriting practice and annuitants is relatively small at each age until about age 95. For women, remaining life expectancy at age 65 was 22.6 years for annuitants and 21.2 years for our prospective purchasers, a difference of 1.4 years. When persons dying after age 95 are excluded, the difference in remaining life expectancy is only 0.3 years. The results are similar for men, although differences are somewhat larger. Remaining life expectancy at age 65 was 19.7 years for male annuitants and 17.4 years for our prospective purchasers, a difference of 2.3 years, which declines to a difference of 1.1 years when men dying after age 95 are excluded.
These differences in mortality may, in fact, be less than estimated because the mortality rates in the annuitant life tables have been "smoothed," with the last hypothetical annuitant not dying until age 115. The smoothing may have resulted in artificially low mortality rates until very extreme ages. The difference also could be due to the positive relationship between socioeconomic status and longevity (Rogers, 1992; Pappas et al., 1993) . Current annuitants are likely to be, on average, of higher socioeconomic status than our prospective purchasers because we do not control for socioeconomic status. Nevertheless, if our prospective purchasers under current practice are shorter-lived than current annuitants, the cost of a stand-alone annuity will be underestimated, which is a conservative bias that works against finding the hypothesized results.
Premium Estimates
We estimate premiums for both the immediate income annuity and for the disability coverage as a lump sum paid at purchase. Long-term care insurance premiums currently are most often level premiums paid monthly or quarterly. This practice makes the timing of eligibility for benefits more important because it affects both the amount of prefunding through premium accumulations and the amount of benefits when they include inflation protection. For comparability, we modeled all premiums as lump sums paid at purchase.
We estimated the premiums for both the annuity and disability benefits by calculating present discounted benefits from the age of purchase to death for each individual and then taking the mean over individuals. The general form of the expected present discounted value of benefits paid for each member of the kth group is given by
where n k is the number of persons in the kth risk group; d j is the number of years between purchase and death for the jth person; B is the initial annual benefit at purchase; jt R is the proportion of the tth year after purchase that the jth person receives benefits ( 1 R in all years except the fractional year of death for the simplest case of a life annuity paid from purchase to death, and 0 1 R c c in each year for the disability benefits); i is the rate of inflation protection; and r is the nominal interest rate.
Because our base policy has a minimum ten-year benefit period, the life annuity payout is computed as the benefit for ten years or for the actual number of years survived, whichever is larger. Premiums for the life annuity were marked up 3.5 percent, and those for the disability coverage were marked up 18 percent to reflect a conventional level of expense loading for annuities and long-term care insurance, respectively, excluding marketing and sales commissions. Long-term care insurance is currently sold both directly and through agents. When sold through agents, commissions are generally similar in pattern and level to those for term life insurance: a large first-year commission, about 50 percent of premium, and lower renewal commissions for the next few years, about 3 percent of premium.
For the basic disability benefit, we used the duration of disability in two or more ADLs or cognitive impairment to calculate when benefits would begin. The disability benefit is modeled with a 30-day waiting period, and a disability must be chronic to qualify for benefits. We defined "chronic" as lasting 90 days. Thus, benefits begin 120 days after the onset of the second ADL or cognitive impairment, as reported on the survey. We modeled no second waiting period for the four-ADL supplemental benefit so that those benefits begin 90 days after the reported onset of the fourth ADL. The nominal interest rate used to discount benefits is 6 percent. There is no inflation protection for either the annuity or the disability benefit in the base policy. We also estimated premiums including inflation protection of 3 percent compounded for the life annuity and 5 percent compounded for the disability benefits.
Our base case is purchase at age 65 on a unisex basis. We also compute premiums by gender and for purchase at age 75. Finally, as a sensitivity analysis, we compute premiums in which we assumed that the presence of benefits would induce earlier claims for disability benefits than would have occurred in the absence of benefits, and in which we assumed that everyone entering a nursing home would obtain immediate certification of qualifying disability. Table 2 profiles life expectancy and disability for prospective purchasers and nonpurchasers under our two underwriting assumptions. Prospective purchasers under current underwriting practice can buy stand-alone income and disability policies at prices reflecting their life expectancy and disability experience. The larger pool of prospective purchasers under minimal underwriting can buy a combined product at a price reflecting their mortality and disability experience. We do not assume that all persons eligible to purchase do so. Rather, we implicitly assume random purchase within the two pools of prospective purchasers so that risk characteristics of actual purchasers would be the same as those for all eligible purchasers.
RESULTS

Impact of Minimal Underwriting on Risk Characteristics
Minimal underwriting dramatically increases the pool of eligible purchasers to 98 percent of persons at age 65, from 77 percent under current underwriting practice. The expansion has relatively modest impacts on mean risk and expected duration of disability in the prospective purchaser pool under minimal underwriting but reduces average survival by 1.5 years. The lack of significant difference in risk and duration of disability between the purchaser pools is consistent with the positive relationship between age and disability and with previous research showing that expected nursing home use among those who would be accepted for long-term care insurance at age 65 was higher than for most groups excluded by underwriting (Murtaugh, Kemper, and Spillman, 1995) . The key to the higher cost of long-term care insurance for the excluded groups in that study of nursing home use was the lack of adequate prefunding of benefit costs because their service use was more likely to happen in the near term. This pattern also applies to the onset of disability, with the prospective purchasers under current practice who ultimately become eligible for benefits doing so 17 years in the future, compared with generally ten years or less for the excluded groups (not shown).
Nonpurchasers under current practice differ from prospective purchasers primarily in mean survival, which is just under 12 years compared with 19.5 years for prospective purchasers. Risk and expected duration of disability are similar to those of prospective purchasers. In contrast, minimal underwriting excludes persons whose survival is only six years on average and whose expected duration of disability is about four times that of prospective purchasers. Table 3 shows the individual premium estimates for the three levels of benefit and a combined premium resulting from the risk patterns in Table 2 . The estimates in the Note: Base income annuity policy is $1,000 per month for life with a minimum ten-year benefit. a Income annuity inflates at 3 percent per year compounded, and disability benefits inflate at 5 percent per year compounded, consistent with long-term care insurance industry standard for inflation protection.
Impacts on Premiums
The premium for the life annuity of $139,827 for the expanded purchaser pool under minimal underwriting is 3.6 percent lower than that for prospective purchasers under current practice because of the expanded pool's lower average survival. This is lower than the 10 percent estimate of the cost of adverse selection in the current annuity market cited earlier (Warshawsky, 1988; Warshawsky, 1988 and 1990; Mitchell et al., 1999; Poterba and Warshawsky, 1999; and Poterba and Finkelstein, 1999) . The difference is in part due to the ten-year minimum benefit in the estimates, which increases income annuity benefits disproportionately among groups excluded from our prospective purchaser pool under current practice because of their shorter survival. The straight life annuities on which the 10 percent estimate was based did not include a minimum benefit. For more direct comparison, the cost of adverse selection in our income annuity with no minimum benefit would be about 6 percent (not shown).
The premiums for disability benefits, like the risk and duration of disability, are similar for the two purchase groups. This is because after minimal underwriting excludes the 2 percent of persons representing the worst disability cost risks, the remaining "poor risks" actually have lower disability costs than those currently accepted for long-term care insurance and reduce the average for the expanded pool. Combined with the lower annuity costs of prospective purchasers under minimal underwriting, the premium for the combined product is $156,326, about 3.4 percent lower than that for an immediate life annuity and equivalent stand-alone long-term care insurance under current underwriting practice.
This pattern is similar when inflation protection is added, in the lower panel of Table  3 , but differences are larger because of the greater impact of the inflation protection on both life annuity and long-term care benefits received further in the future by prospective purchasers under current underwriting practice. In particular, this can be seen in the premium for two-ADL disability with minimal underwriting, which is $33,122 or 6 percent lower than under current practice. With inflation protection, the premium for the combined benefits for the expanded pool is about 5 percent below the premium for the stand-alone products under current underwriting practice.
Both with and without inflation protection, the overall premium for a combined life annuity and disability policy for the entire cohort of persons turning 65 is only slightly higher than that for the expanded pool. This is because the impact of lower average survival on the life annuity premiums partially offsets the higher costs of the disability benefits. While a private insurer might not be willing to immediately cover persons already in claim, the implication is that the small group excluded by minimal underwriting would have little impact on costs for a mandatory public program, in which there is pooling over all risks. A private insurer might, however, be willing to issue coverage to those persons already in claim if their eligibility for disability payments were deferred for two or three years.
Relative Benefits by Risk Group
A key issue is whether a combined product offered at a lower price would attract the expanded purchase pool on which the lower premium is based and, if so, whether the product would be appropriate for the marginal groups purchasing. This would depend on the value that various groups receive directly from benefits and indirectly from the value of insurance protection. To examine this issue, Table 4 compares ratios of fair premiums for prospective purchasers and nonpurchasers under current underwriting practice to fair premiums for prospective purchasers under minimal underwriting. Those excluded under current practice are also broken out according to their underlying risk categories. The ratios show the proportion of the premium under minimal underwriting that would be attributable to direct income and disability benefits. Where the ratio is less than one, it would not be advantageous for members of that group on average to purchase unless they perceived value (in an expected utility sense) from having insurance protection sufficient to bring their perceived direct and indirect benefit ratio to at least one. Note: Base income annuity policy is $1,000 per month for life with a minimum ten-year benefit. a Income annuity inflates at 3 percent per year compounded, and disability benefits inflate at 5 percent per year compounded, consistent with long-term care insurance industry standard for inflation protection.
Prospective purchasers under current practice would receive direct income and disability benefits greater than the premium for prospective purchasers under minimal underwriting. Overall, ignoring any value perceived from having insurance, this group would receive direct benefits on average about 3.5 percent above the premium it would have to pay. This group's direct long-term care benefits would be 1.3 percent higher than the premium under minimal underwriting for the two-ADL benefit and 2.4 percent for the four-ADL benefit.
Among the groups excluded from long-term care insurance purchase by current underwriting practice, only those with cognitive impairment at age 65, all of whom also would be excluded under minimal underwriting, and those with at least one ADL limitation at age 65, some of whom would be excluded, would have expected direct benefits higher than the premium under minimal underwriting for the combined benefit. This is because their extremely high average disability benefits more than make up for their low mean annuity benefits. The remaining groups all have premium ratios for the combined product less than 1, indicating that they would have to perceive enough indirect value from insurance protection to bring perceived direct and indirect benefits up to the level of the premium they would pay under minimal underwriting. The "worst off" are those with heart problems, who would receive less-than-average benefits for the life annuity and both disability benefits, resulting in an overall direct benefit of 78 percent of premium, slightly below their direct benefits for the life annuity alone. For the remaining excluded groups, however, adding long-term care benefits improves the direct benefit to premium ratio for the combined product relative to the life annuity alone.
For purchase to be advantageous to the groups with direct benefits below premium, they would have to perceive indirect value from insurance ranging from about 3 percent of premium for those who had suffered a stroke by age 65 to 22 percent for the heart attack group. In dollar terms, the perceived value of being insured for life would have to be about $4,000 in the first case and $34,000 in the second for these groups to be willing to purchase. It should be noted that, because the risk categories are not mutually exclusive, ratios of benefits to premium for all groups containing some members who would be excluded under minimal underwriting are somewhat overstated, so that required perceived insurance value is somewhat understated. More than 60 percent of those in the ADL limitation and cognitive impairment groups also appear in one or more of the other excluded categories, but a majority of persons in the remaining excluded groups appear in only one group.
Adding inflation protection to the policy increases the direct benefits of the prospective purchaser group under current underwriting for both the life annuity and stand-alone long-term care coverage because of the higher cost of benefits in the distant future. Consistent with the findings in Murtaugh, Kemper, and Spillman (1995) for nursing home coverage, inflation protection reduces the relative cost of disability benefits for the excluded groups because their disability generally occurs in the nearer term, as well as reducing the relative value of the life annuity. As a result, the excluded groups receive lower direct benefits from the combined product. In this case, those with heart problems would receive benefits of 67.5 percent of the premium paid for the combined product. With inflation protection, direct benefits are below premium for both the life annuity and the disability coverages for all except those with ADL limitation, cognitive impairment, and history of stroke. Perceived indirect value of insurance protection would have to be 10 percent of premium for those with a history of stroke and 32.5 percent for those with heart problems for purchase to be advantageous.
Our estimates include expense loadings of 3.5 percent on the income annuity and 18 percent on the disability benefit, for an average 5 percent on the combined product. Although these loadings cancel out of the ratios showing the percent of premium going to direct benefits, in practice, the indirect benefits perceived from insurance would also have to be sufficient to cover these insurer expenses, as well as additional sales and marketing costs in some cases.
Although there is no direct empirical evidence on the indirect benefits that people receive from a life annuity and long-term care insurance, there are formal models that attempt to simulate willingness to pay for life annuities. For example, use an explicit individual utility function and compare the expected utility from purchasing an annuity with that from nonannuity methods of decumulating assets during retirement. They use realistic mortality, interest, tax, and inflation rates and estimates of risk-preference parameters gathered from the literature. The simulated expected utility gains suggest the value of an annuity to individuals is between 23 and 31 percent of wealth. Presumably, consideration of the risk of incurring long-term care expenses would not reduce and likely would increase the indirect insurance value of a combined income and disability annuity. Table 5 disaggregates results for our base policy at age 65 without inflation protection by gender to examine differences in the effect of minimal underwriting on the size of the expanded purchase pool and premiums for the combined coverages. Although employer-sponsored benefit plans are not allowed to vary premiums or payouts by gender, other insurance products may. Substantial evidence shows that women, who have greater life expectancy than men, also have higher long-term care costs, a greater rate of chronic disability, and longer survival with disability (Kemper and Murtaugh, 1991; Manton, 1997; and Guralnik et al., 1997) . Besides women's greater rate of disability, other factors suggest long-term care costs would be higher for women than those for men. Because of their greater longevity, women are more likely to be available to provide informal long-term care if their husbands become disabled and are also more likely to be widowed and thus without a spouse to provide informal long-term care if they themselves become disabled. This could contribute to a differentially greater demand for benefits by women with long-term care needs. Ratios of premiums for the various risk groups relative to those for the expanded purchase pool are given for the life annuity and the two levels of disability protection, as well as for the combined coverage. The ratios are calculated within the gender grouping.
Results by Gender
Minimal underwriting has a larger effect for men than for women, because of their earlier onset of conditions associated with the excluded groups under current underwriting practice. More than a quarter of men would be excluded at age 65 from purchase of long-term care insurance under current practice compared with 19 percent of women. Under minimal underwriting, 97.6 percent of men and 98.3 percent of women would be eligible to purchase a combined life annuity and disability benefit. Note: Base income annuity policy is $1,000 per month for life with a minimum ten-year benefit.
a Immediate annuity benefit of $1,000 per month, two-ADL disability benefit of $2,000 per month, and four-ADL disability benefit of $1,000 per month Consistent with their greater longevity and chronic disability, women would have premiums for the combined product that are higher than those for men. Women in the two purchaser pools would pay premiums about 14 percent higher than men for the combined coverage. Among those excluded under current underwriting practice, women on average would have premiums about 10 percent higher than those for men, with a range from about 1 percent higher for those with heart problems to about 12 percent for those with cognitive impairment. Premiums for women excluded under minimal underwriting are only about 4 percent higher than those for men.
Considering the premium ratios, the cost of adverse selection in the life annuity is slightly lower for women. The cost of the annuity for female prospective purchasers under current underwriting practice is about 3 percent higher than that for the expanded pool under minimal underwriting, compared with 4 percent higher for men. For women, disability benefit premiums under current underwriting practice are also higher than under minimal underwriting-1 percent higher for the two-ADL benefit and 2.3 percent higher for four-ADL benefits. Conversely, for men, premiums for both disability benefits are slightly lower under current practice than under minimal underwriting. If priced by gender, the premium for combined coverage under current practice is 2.8 percent higher for women and 3.6 percent higher for men than it would be under minimal underwriting.
For the groups excluded under current underwriting practice, direct benefits would represent a smaller percent of the premium under minimal underwriting for women than for men. This implies that if the combined product were to be priced separately by gender, women in these groups would have to perceive more indirect benefit from insurance value than men for purchase to be advantageous. For both men and women, those who already have ADL limitations or cognitive impairment at age 65 would receive direct benefits exceeding the premium under minimal underwriting. For the remaining groups, women purchasing the combined product would have to perceive insurance value ranging from 4 percent for those with history of stroke to 26 percent for those with heart problems. For men, the range is 1 percent to 16 percent for the same conditions. These gender differences confirm the potential for adverse selection by gender if products are priced for the full population. Women in the expanded purchasing pool would have a gender-specific premium for the combined annuity and disability benefits about 6 percent higher than the gender-neutral premium for all persons, while the gender-specific premium for men would be about 7 percent below that for all persons.
Results for Purchase at Age 75
Many persons currently postpone considering long-term care insurance for several years after retirement, and they sometimes find that their health precludes them from purchase. Our estimates are that by age 75, over 30 percent of persons would be underwritten out of long-term care coverage under current practice (Table 6 ). Minimal underwriting would expand the potential purchasing pool for a combined life annuity and disability product to 94.5 percent of persons at age 75 and reduce the premium for a combined product relative to stand-alone purchase by $4,355, or 3.1 percent. Note: Base income annuity policy is $1,000 per month for life with a minimum ten-year benefit.
a Immediate annuity benefit of $1,000 per month, two-ADL disability benefit of $2,000 per month, and four-ADL disability benefit of $1,000
per month
Premiums for annuity and disability coverage, both under current underwriting practice and minimal underwriting, perhaps surprisingly, are about 13 percent below those at age 65. This relatively small differential is due to a tradeoff between the life annuity premiums about 20 percent below those at age 65 and disability benefit premiums 50 to 60 percent higher.
At age 75, the cost of adverse selection in the life annuity with a ten-year guaranteed period is about 3 percent, and the cost of stand-alone long-term care insurance is about 3 percent higher for two-ADL benefits and about 6 percent higher for four-ADL benefits than the disability benefit premiums under minimal underwriting. There are some differences in the direct benefits for the risk groups relative to those at age 65. By age 75, in addition to those with ADL limitation and cognitive impairment, those with a history of stroke would have direct benefits exceeding premium under minimal underwriting. The indirect benefits from insurance value required to make purchase advantageous range from less than 1 percent for those with an unhealthy lifestyle to 13 percent for those with heart problems.
The Impact of Underestimating Benefits
Cash disability benefits have theoretical advantages over the service benefits most often provided by existing long-term care insurance. They allow the disabled person to select whatever goods or services provide the greatest benefit without imposing restrictions on the site of care or type of provider. They do not promote overuse of services because the amount of the benefit is not tied to the amount of service. However, cash benefits also are clearly of value to the nondisabled as well as the disabled. Thus, they may be even more subject than service benefits to moral hazard, the behavioral response in which losses are greater when benefits are available than when they are not. In the case of medical care or conventional long-term care insurance service benefits, moral hazard is overuse of services because insurance effectively reduces the price to the consumer. Needed services are more likely to be used, and services that otherwise would not be valued enough to purchase would be purchased at the lower insured price. This results not only in potential inefficiencies but also in higher expected claims costs to the insurer and higher premiums. A slightly different form of this response is sometimes called "ADL creep" in cases in which ADLs are used to determine eligibility for benefits, such as long-term care insurance or programs. "ADL creep" results from the incentive to overstate disability in order to become eligible for benefits at lower levels of disability or earlier in the course of disability. While this response would not have the same efficiency implications as overuse of services in the case of a service benefit, it would have similar impacts on costs and premiums. It also is distinct from a case in which those with no disability fraudulently claim benefits. Cash benefit policies are on the market, and we assume here that insurers can control outright fraud. Rather, "ADL creep" refers to a more subtle phenomenon in which the disabled and their medical providers respond to financial incentives to inflate disability levels.
Actual disability levels occurring in the population also might be higher than in our estimates because of underreporting of disability and disability duration in survey data (see Appendix). In that case, actual direct benefits also would be higher than we estimate, but not because of a behavioral response. To the extent that the impact of underreporting is greater (smaller) among groups with lower-than-average direct benefits, the percent of premium attributable to direct benefits would be understated (overstated). Although the simulations are couched in terms of potential forms of "ADL creep," they apply to the impact of underreporting to the extent that underreporting occurs in the stylized forms used.
We simulate three potential types of "ADL creep" (or underreporting) for the base policy at age 65 (Table 7) . Estimates in the top panel are from a simulation in which we assumed that "ADL inflation" occurred. Specifically, we assumed that persons with one ADL limitation would be willing and able to obtain certification that they had two ADL limitations to receive the first level of benefits earlier. Similarly, persons with three ADLs would obtain certification that they had four. The middle panel assumes that insured persons would be able to obtain certification immediately upon onset of two ADLs or four ADLs rather than have to meet the 90-day criterion for a chronic limitation. The final panel assumes that all persons entering a nursing home would immediately qualify for the first level of benefits. Because nursing home entry is not an explicit benefit criterion, this has the effect of providing benefits to some who used a nursing home but never met the two-ADL criterion and providing benefits earlier to some whose two-ADL disability occurred after nursing home entry. In all three panels, estimates are premiums for the disability benefits and for the combined product under the simulation, relative to base premiums.
The most serious impacts would be attributable to ADL inflation. Premiums for the two disability benefits would be 40 to 56 percent higher. It is clear why the expanded purchase pool's premium increase would be greater. All persons in the group excluded from long-term care purchase because they had one ADL limitation at age 65 would by definition meet the disability criterion soon after purchase. Even among those with no limitation at age 65, disability benefit premiums would be 40 percent higher. Nevertheless the impact on overall premiums for the combined product is modest-only 4 to 6 percent higher than with no ADL inflation. The small overall impact results in part from the fact that the monthly income annuity payment represents 90 percent of the combined premium because of the long period over which it is paid; this is despite the fact that the monthly income annuity payment is half the two-ADL disability benefit. Thus, even a substantial increase in the disability payment will have a relatively small impact on the overall premium. Interpreted in terms of underreporting, because there is a larger percentage increase (11 percent) in premiums for nonpurchasers under current underwriting than for purchasers under minimal underwriting (6 percent), the percent of premium reflecting direct benefits for the excluded groups would increase slightly.
The impacts for the simulation of certification at onset in the middle panel are quite modest, and because they are proportional for the various groups, the impact on relative direct benefits is nil. This is not surprising since the simulation rolls back the benefit period only 90 days. The result is an increase of only 10 to 16 percent in disability benefit premiums and an overall impact on the premium for the combined product of only 1 percent. Clearly, the impact would be larger the earlier certification occurred. In the extreme case, this simulation is bounded by the ADL inflation case, in which those with only one ADL limitation obtain certification for two-ADL benefits. a Assumes that all those with one ADL would obtain certification for two ADLs and those with three ADLs would obtain certification as having four ADLs if disability benefits were available b Assumes that certification for chronic two-ADL and four-ADL disability, respectively, would be obtained three months earlier if disability benefits were available. c Assumes that all persons entering nursing homes would gain certification for chronic two-ADL disability on admission Finally, the impact of assuming that all nursing home users qualify for benefits on admission (bottom panel) is about a 30 percent increase in the two-ADL benefit premium. We did not model any change in the receipt of four-ADL benefits. The small drop in the four-ADL benefit for prospective purchasers under minimal underwriting occurs because 0.3 percent of persons are no longer eligible to purchase because they were already in nursing homes at age 65. (This can also be seen among the nonpurchasers. The newly excluded cases are expensive relative to purchasers, but inexpensive relative to the rest of nonpurchasers under minimal underwriting, resulting in a slight reduction in their expected benefits.) The net impact on the combined coverage premiums is again quite small-only a 3 percent increase-and proportional for purchaser and excluded groups. Thus, there is no impact on relative direct benefits.
DISCUSSION
Our analysis has demonstrated our basic proposition that combining an income annuity with disability coverage has the potential to reduce the cost of both products as they now exist in the market and make them available to more potential purchasers. We showed that minimal underwriting, excluding only those who would be eligible for benefits at purchase, would increase the potential market to about 98 percent of 65-year-olds, compared with only 77 percent under current underwriting practice. After the 2 percent representing the worst risks for high disability payments were excluded, simulated premiums for both the income annuity and the disability benefits were lower than our simulated premiums for the current stand-alone markets.
In fact, in any mandatory purchase scheme for combined income and disability protection, such as a social insurance program, the estimates indicate that including those who are currently disabled would have little impact on costs because there are so few of these extremely high-cost cases and because their lower annuity costs partially offset their higher disability costs. The low direct income annuity benefits for all those with health problems, but particularly for this group, is due to their shorter average lifetimes.
Whether the potential shown by our simulation is realized in the private market, in which purchase is voluntary, depends in large part on the direct benefits various would-be purchasers expect and the value they place on the indirect benefit of insurance protection. For the most part, direct benefits for those who would be newly able to purchase long-term care protection with minimal underwriting would be below the fair premium for the income annuity and above fair premium for the disability premium. This tradeoff between lower survival and generally greater disability costs of the groups currently excluded from long-term care coverage purchase results in net direct benefits on average of 94 cents per premium dollar, with the worst case being those with heart problems, who would receive only about 78 cents on the dollar.
Several other factors would affect the direct benefits that would be received by the various groups. The first is inflation protection, which is more important the earlier in life that either an annuity or long-term care policy is purchased. Inflation protection increases the gap between benefits received and premium paid for the excluded groups because it increases benefits more for the longer-lived prospective purchasers under current underwriting. The second factor is specification of a ten-year mini-mum benefit in the income annuity. As noted earlier, this common feature in current annuity markets tends to favor those excluded under current underwriting because they are less likely to survive ten years. Removing the ten-year minimum benefit would reduce the price but also significantly reduce the value of the coverage to the groups excluded under current underwriting. Simulations that we did not report indicate that direct benefits for these groups would fall from 94 cents per premium dollar on average to 84 cents, before considering expense loadings, if there was no minimum benefit.
Finally, in addition to underwriting, insurers currently protect themselves against adverse selection in the long-term care market by imposing a waiting period before any benefits can be received. At least some of the new products combining an income annuity and disability benefits that have come onto the market since this research began have waiting periods of several years. A long waiting period is a substantial deterrent to purchase for those who have reason to expect near-term long-term care use because it makes the coverage less valuable to them. Because the combined benefit has to be attractive to a mix of high and low risks for both benefits in order for risk pooling to work in the way we demonstrate it can work, new approaches to product design are needed. A guaranteed ten-year minimum payout of the life annuity is one policy feature that makes a combined product more attractive to individuals who think they may have a shorter-than-average life expectancy. Allowing individuals to select a policy from a range of products that vary the ratio of the disability and life annuity payments is another option that should be considered. In any case, insurers need to be careful not to introduce significant "protections" against high disability cases precisely because those who currently are underwritten out of the private long-term care insurance market or discouraged by long waiting periods are necessary for risk pooling in a combined product to result in lower premiums.
A final issue is how many retirees would find the combined benefits affordable, an issue that is beyond the scope of this study but that we intend to explore further in future work. Our estimated premium for a $1,000 monthly life annuity, with a $2,000 monthly base disability benefit and a $1,000 monthly increment for higher disability, is $156,000 at age 65 with no inflation protection and $219,000 with inflation protection. The products currently on the market are targeted in some, if not all, cases toward those with substantial retirement savings. The most obvious application is to those with tax-deferred retirement savings, such as 401(k) plans through an employer and/or individual retirement accounts, large enough to cover the initial investment. The trend away from annuitized pension benefits and toward lump-sum distribution options provides further currency for the idea of creating vehicles through which these distributions could be used to provide jointly for income security and disability protection. We have noted the inverse relationship between socioeconomic status, health, and mortality. This link suggests that affordability for a broad range of retirees is important not only for the size of the market but also for the ability to realize the benefits of risk pooling demonstrated here.
In future work, we will be examining more closely the implications of socioeconomic status, in particular, for the likely size of the market for a combined benefit and for the distribution of risks among likely purchasers. In addition, we will be developing new, more recent data that will allow us to examine the importance of gender and marital status for benefit design and premiums. Because women are more likely than men to be available to provide informal care to a disabled spouse and also more likely to be widowed and thus without a husband who could provide informal care, it is important to consider how potential informal care resources affect insurance decisions. These factors highlight the importance of analyzing the premium and risk implications of joint purchase by spouses. This likely purchase scenario could be used to offset the gender differences that make coverage more costly for women and that could promote adverse selection by gender in any voluntary system in which benefits are not priced by gender.
APPENDIX: STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE DATA, METHODS, AND ASSUMPTIONS
The National Mortality Followback Survey is a unique and highly valuable source of information on the lifetime health and disability history of a large, nationally representative cohort of decedents. By reweighting the survey, we can make projections of disability and the need for long-term care for current cohorts turning ages 65 and 75 that are useful for evaluating private and public policies. There are, however, limitations, as in any use of survey data.
First, proxy respondents may underreport health events, although carefully designed studies have found no evidence of a difference between proxy and self reports in other data (Moore, 1988; Mathiowetz and Groves, 1985) . Long recall periods may also contribute to underreporting. Generally, research based on recall periods of a year or less suggests that long recall periods lead to underreporting (Marquis, 1978; Cannell, Marquis, and Laurent, 1977) . A study of a longer recall period (two and a half years) found that, while there was underreporting overall, the major determinant of error was the importance of the event (Mathiowetz and Duncan, 1988) . More than 80 percent of proxies in the NMFS are immediate family members (i.e., spouses, children, or siblings) who should be knowledgeable about changes in decedents' physical and cognitive functioning. Nevertheless, there could be some underreporting in our data, in particular, total length of time the decedent had an ADL limitation or cognitive impairment before death. Our analysis of ADL creep provides some indication of the magnitude of the potential impact on our results of substantial levels of underreporting.
Limitations in the survey data on disability also are a potential source of error. The survey does not capture information on an ADL limitation or cognitive impairment if it was not present at some point in the last year of life. Analyses of longitudinal data conducted by Manton, Corder, and Stallard (1993) suggest that some chronically disabled seniors experience improvement in their ability to perform IADLs and/or ADLs, although very few with significant levels of disability regained full independence in ADLs.
Our data also include information on only five ADLs (eating, toileting, dressing, bathing, and walking). Insurers typically include a sixth ADL, transferring from bed to chair, and, less often, incontinence. Inability to transfer has implications for whether an individual is independent in other activities such as toileting, dressing, and bathing, so that the impact on our estimates may not be large. On the other hand, we include walking, which is broader than the indoor mobility criteria more commonly used in benefit determinations. This would tend to overstate eligibility for benefits. Again, however, because of the financial incentive for persons to report higher levels of disability to obtain benefits, the impact on our cost estimates relative to what would happen in an operating program is not clear.
Finally, an assumption of the reweighting is that the past relationship among gender, age, and disability will continue in the future. Growing evidence shows that agespecific disability rates are declining (Waidmann and Manton, 1998; Manton, Corder, and Stallard, 1993; Freedman and Martin, 1998) . On the other hand, the effect of the reweighting is to disproportionately increase the size of the weights of persons dying at old ages in 1986.
To assess the reasonableness of disability estimates from the reweighted NMFS, we compared the length of time persons were expected to be disabled after age 65 with published estimates of remaining lifetime disability. Although constructed from a decedent cohort, our estimates of remaining lifetime disability appear to be within the range of those from two other national surveys. Among those surviving to age 65, our estimate of the number of years of cognitive impairment or disability in two or more ADLs is 1.1 years for men and 1.9 years for women. For cognitive impairment or disability in one or more ADLs, our estimate is 1.6 years for men and 2.6 years for women. (These figures are slight underestimates of total duration because they exclude the first 120 days of disability, the effective length of time persons must be disabled in our analyses before receiving disability benefits). Crimmins, Hayward, and Saito (1996) found lower remaining lifetime disability at age 70, using pooled data from all three rounds of the Longitudinal Study of Aging (LSOA). Their estimates of the average length of time between age 70 and death that individuals will be unable to perform "by oneself and without aids" one or more of five ADLs or will be residents of an institution are 0.8 years for men and 1.8 years for women. Manton, Stallard, and Liu (1993) use the National Long Term Care Survey (NLTCS) to estimate remaining years in each of various disability "profiles." Their estimates of the combined time between age 65 and death in four of the disability states (physical impairment, frail, high frail, and institutional), which together roughly approximate our two-ADL disability measure, are 1.1 years for men and 2.8 years for women. The different definitions of disability make the comparison of the NMFS estimates with others less than ideal, but our estimates appear to be within the range defined by the estimates from these two national surveys. Though well above LSOA estimates for both men and women, they are similar for men and low for women relative to the NLTCS estimates.
